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Abstract—1 In this paper, the fading broadcast channel with
confidential messages is studied in the presence of statistical
quality of service (QoS) constraints in the form of limitations on
the buffer length. We employ the effective capacity formulation
to measure the throughput of the confidential and common
messages. We assume that the channel side information (CSI)
is available at both the transmitter and the receivers. Assuming
average power constraints at the transmitter side, we first
define the effective secure throughput region, and prove that the
throughput region is convex. Then, we obtain the optimal power
control policies that achieve the boundary points of the effective
secure throughput region.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is an important issue in wireless systems due to
the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions. In a pioneering
work, Wyner in [1] addressed the security problem from an
information-theoretic point of view and considered a wire-
tap channel model. He proved that secure transmission of
confidential messages to a destination in the presence of a
degraded wire-tapper can be achieved, and he established
the secrecy capacity which is defined as the highest rate of
reliable communication from the transmitter to the legitimate
receiver while keeping the wire-tapper completely ignorant of
the transmitted messages. Recently, there has been numerous
studies addressing information theoretic security. For instance,
the impact of fading has been investigated in [2], where it has
been shown that a non-zero secrecy capacity can be achieved
even when the eavesdropper channel is better than the main
channel on average. The secrecy capacity region of the fading
broadcast channel with confidential messages and associated
optimal power control policies have been identified in [4],
where it is shown that the transmitter allocates more power
as the strength of the main channel increases with respect to
that of the eavesdropper channel.
In addition to security issues, providing acceptable perfor-
mance and quality is vital to many applications. For instance,
voice over IP (VoIP) and interactive-video (e.g,. videocon-
ferencing) systems are required to satisfy certain buffer or
delay constraints. In this paper, we consider statistical QoS
constraints in the form of limitations on the buffer length, and
incorporate the concept of effective capacity [5], which can
be seen as the maximum constant arrival rate that a given
time-varying service process can support while satisfying
statistical QoS guarantees. The analysis and application of
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Fig. 1. The general system model.
effective capacity in various settings have attracted much
interest recently (see e.g., [6]–[8] and references therein). We
define the effective secrecy throughput region as the maximum
constant arrival rate pairs that can be supported while the
service rate is confined by the secrecy capacity region. We
assume that the channel side information is known at both the
transmitter and receivers. Then, following a similar analysis as
shown in [4], we obtain the optimal power allocation policies
that achieve points on the boundary of the effective secrecy
throughput region.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly describes the system model and the necessary prelimi-
naries on statistical QoS constraints and effective capacity. In
Section III, we present our main results on the optimal power
control policies. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
We consider a scenario in which a single transmitter broad-
casts messages to two receivers. The transmitter wishes to
send receiver 1 confidential messages that need to kept secret
from receiver 2, and also at the same time send common
messages to both receivers. A depiction of the system model is
given in Figure 1. It is assumed that the transmitter generates
data sequences which are divided into frames of duration T .
These data frames are initially stored in the buffer before they
are transmitted over the wireless channel. The channel input-
output relationships are given by
Y1[i] = h1[i]X [i] + Z1[i] andY2[i] = h2[i]X [i] + Z2[i] (1)
where i is the frame index, X [i] is the channel input in the
ith frame, and Y1[i] and Y2[i] represent the channel outputs
at the receivers 1 and 2 at frame i, respectively. We assume
that {hj [i], j = 1, 2}’s are jointly stationary and ergodic
discrete-time processes, and we denote the magnitude-square
of the fading coefficients by zj [i] = |hj[i]|2. Considering
that receiver 1 is the main user to which we send both the
common and confidential messages, while receiver 2, to which
we send only the common messages, can be regarded as an
eavesdropper for the confidential messages, we replace z1 with
zM and z2 with zE to increase the clarity in the subsequent
formulations. The channel input is subject to an average power
constraint E{|X [i]|2} ≤ P¯ , and we assume that the bandwidth
available for the system is B. Above, Zj [i] is a zero-mean,
circularly symmetric, complex Gaussian random variable with
variance E{|Zj [i]|2} = Nj . The additive Gaussian noise
samples {Zj[i]} are assumed to form an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence.
Note that we denote the average transmitted signal-to-noise
ratio with respect to receiver 1 as SNR = P¯
N1B
. We also denote
P [i] as the instantaneous transmit power in the ith frame. Now,
the instantaneous transmitted SNR level for receiver 1 becomes
µ1[i] = P [i]
N1B
. Then, the average power constraint at the base
station is equivalent to the average SNR constraint E{µ1[i]} ≤
SNR for receiver 1. If we denote the ratio between the noise
powers of the two channels as γ = N1
N2
, the instantaneous
transmitted SNR level for receiver 2 becomes µ2[i] = γµ1[i].
We denote z = (zE , zM ) as the vector composed of the
channel states for receivers 2 and 1. Under the block fading
assumption, the maximal instantaneous service rate is decided
by the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian broadcast
channel with confidential messages (BCC) for each interval
with a pair of specific channel states realizations (zE , zM ).
We define µ = (µ0(z), µ1(z)) as the power allocation policies
for the common and confidential messages, respectively. We
denote the region Z = {z : zM > γzE} as the region in which
both confidential and common messages are transmitted. Zc
represents the region where zM ≤ γzE . If z lies in Zc, only
the common messages are transmitted. Note that µ1(z) = 0
for z ∈ Zc. We then define the set U as the power allocation
policies satisfying the power constraints
U = {µ : Ez∈Z{µ0(z) + µ1(z)} + Ez∈Zc{µ0(z)} ≤ SNR} . (2)
With the above notations, the secrecy capacity region of the
fading BCC is given by [4]
Rs =
⋃
µ∈U

(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ min


Ez∈Z
{
log2
(
1 + µ0(z)zM
1+µ1(z)zM
)}
+Ez∈Zc {log2 (1 + µ0(z)zM )} ,
Ez∈Z
{
log2
(
1 + γµ0(z)zE
1+γµ1(z)zE
)}
+Ez∈Zc {log2 (1 + γµ0(z)zE)}


R1 ≤ Ez∈Z {log2 (1 + µ1(z)zM )− log2 (1 + γµ1(z)zE)}


(3)
B. Statistical QoS Constraints and Effective Secure Through-
put
In [5], Wu and Negi defined the effective capacity as the
maximum constant arrival rate2 that a given service process
can support in order to guarantee a statistical QoS requirement
specified by the QoS exponent θ. If we define Q as the
stationary queue length, then θ is the decay rate of the tail
distribution of the queue length Q:
lim
q→∞
logP (Q ≥ q)
q
= −θ. (4)
Therefore, for large qmax, we have the following approxima-
tion for the buffer violation probability: P (Q ≥ qmax) ≈
e−θqmax . Hence, while larger θ corresponds to more strict
QoS constraints, smaller θ implies looser QoS guarantees.
Similarly, if D denotes the steady-state delay experienced in
the buffer, then P (D ≥ dmax) ≈ e−θδdmax for large dmax,
where δ is determined by the arrival and service processes
[7].
The effective capacity is given by
C(θ) = −
Λ(−θ)
θ
= − lim
t→∞
1
θt
loge E{e
−θS[t]} bits/s, (5)
where the expectation is with respect to S[t] =
∑t
i=1 s[i],
which is the time-accumulated service process. {s[i], i =
1, 2, . . .} denote the discrete-time stationary and ergodic
stochastic service process. We define the effective capacity
region obtained when the service rate is confined by the
secrecy capacity region as the effective secrecy throughput
region.
In this paper, in order to simplify the analysis while consid-
ering general fading distributions, we assume that the fading
coefficients stay constant over the frame duration T and vary
independently for each frame and each user. In this scenario,
s[i] = TR[i], where R[i] is the instantaneous service rate for
common or confidential messages in the ith frame duration
[iT ; (i+ 1)T ]. Then, (5) can be written as
C(θ) = −
1
θT
loge Ez{e
−θTR[i]} bits/s, (6)
where R[i] denotes the instantaneous rate sequence with re-
spect to z. (6) is obtained using the fact that instantaneous rates
{R[i]} vary independently. The effective secrecy throughput
normalized by bandwidth B is
C(θ) =
C(θ)
B
bits/s/Hz. (7)
III. EFFECTIVE SECRECY THROUGHPUT REGION
In this section, we investigate the fading broadcast channel
with confidential message (BCC) by incorporating the statis-
tical QoS constraints. Liang et al. in [4] have shown that the
fading channel can be viewed as a set of parallel subchannels
with each corresponding to one fading state. In [4], it has
been assumed that no delay constraints are imposed on the
2For time-varying arrival rates, effective capacity specifies the effective
bandwidth of the arrival process that can be supported by the channel.
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transmitted messages. Under such an assumption, the ergodic
secrecy capacity region is determined and the optimal power
allocation policies achieving the boundary of the capacity
region are identified.
In this paper, we analyze the performance under statistical
buffer constraints by considering the effective capacity formu-
lation. According to the formula for effective capacity (6), we
first have the following result.
Proposition 1: The effective secure throughput region of
the fading BCC is
Ces =
⋃
µ∈U
{
(C0,C1) : Cj ≤ −
1
θTB
loge E{e
−θTRj[i]},
subject to ∀E{R} ∈ Cs
}
(8)
where R = (R0, R1) is the vector composed of the in-
stantaneous rates for the common and confidential messages,
respectively.
We assume that E{R} can take any possible value defined
in the ergodic secrecy capacity region Cs. Since the secrecy ca-
pacity region is convex [4], we can easily prove the following.
Theorem 1: The effective secrecy throughput region is con-
vex.
Proof: Let the two effective capacity pairs C1 = (C10,C11)
and C2 = (C20,C21) belong to Ces. Therefore, there exists
some R[i] and R′[i] for C1(Θ) and C2(Θ), respectively. By
a time sharing strategy, for any α ∈ (0, 1), we know that
E{αR[i] + (1− α)R′[i]} ∈ Rs.
αC1 + (1− α)C2
= −
1
θTB
loge
(
E
{
e−θTR[i]
})α (
E
{
e−θTR
′[i]
})1−α
= −
1
θTB
loge
(
E
{(
e−θTαR[i]
) 1
α
})α
·
(
E
{(
e−θT (1−α)R
′[i]
) 1
1−α
})1−α
≤ −
1
θTB
loge E
{
e−θT(αR[i]+(1−α)R
′[i])
}
. (9)
Above, the vector operation is with respect to each compo-
nent. The inequality in the last stage follows from Ho¨lder’s
inequality. Hence, αC1+(1−α)C2 still lies in the throughput
region. 
Then, the points on the boundary surface of the effective
throughput region (C∗0,C∗1) can be obtained by solving the
following optimization problem
max
µ∈U
λ0C0 + λ1C1 (10)
where λ = (λ0, λ1) is any vector in R2+. The optimal power
allocation policies for the above problem can be solved using
a similar approach as in [3], which is stated in [4, Lemma 2]
as well. Note that due to the introduction of QoS constraints,
the service rate is limited by the channel conditions while the
maximization is over the effective throughput. We first have
the following result.
Lemma 1: The optimal µ∗ that solves (10) falls into the one
of the following three cases:
Case I: R01(µ∗) < R02(µ∗) andµ∗ maximizesλ0C01(µ) + λ1C1(µ);
Case II: R01(µ∗) > R02(µ∗) andµ∗ maximizesλ0C02(µ) + λ1C1(µ);
Case III: R01(µ∗) = R02(µ∗) then
A)µ∗ maximizesλ0C01(µ) + λ1C1(µ), ifC01(µ) > C02(µ);
B)µ∗ maximizesλ0C02(µ) + λ1C1(µ), ifC01(µ) < C02(µ);
C)µ∗ maximizesλ0 (δC01(µ) + (1− δ)C02(µ)) + λ1C1(µ),
if there exists 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 such that C01(µ) = C02(µ).
(11)
Above, R01(µ) and R02(µ) are the two terms that R0(µ) can
take in the minimization in (3), and C01(µ) and C02(µ) are
the associated effective throughput values.
Next, we derive the optimal power allocation µ∗ that solves
(10) for the different cases detailed above. Note that the
maximal confidential message rate is defined as
R1 =
{
log2
(
1+µ1(z)zM
1+γµ1(z)zE
)
, z ∈ Z
0, z ∈ Zc
(12)
Case I: The maximal instantaneous common message rate
is given by the rate of receiver 1
R01 =
{
log2
(
1 + µ0(z)zM1+µ1(z)zM
)
, z ∈ Z
log2 (1 + µ0(z)zM ) , z ∈ Z
c
(13)
as long as the obtained power control policy satisfies
R01(µ) < R02(µ). (14)
Then, the Lagrangian is given by
J = −
λ0
β loge 2
loge
(∫
z∈Z
(
1 +
µ0(z)zM
1 + µ1(z)zM
)−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
+
∫
z∈Zc
(1 + µ0(z)zM )
−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
)
−
λ1
β loge 2
loge
(∫
z∈Z
(
1 + µ1(z)zM
1 + γµ1(z)zM
)−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
+
∫
z∈Zc
pz(zM , zE)dz
)
− κ (Ez∈Z{µ0(z) + µ1(z)}+ Ez∈Zc{µ0(z)}) (15)
With specific power control policies, the values of (C0,C1)
are determined. Hence, we can define the following
φ0 =
∫
z∈Z
(
1 +
µ0(z)zM
1 + µ1(z)zM
)−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
+
∫
z∈Zc
(1 + µ0(z)zM )
−β
pz(zM , zE)dz (16)
φ1 =
∫
z∈Z
(
1 + µ1(z)zM
1 + γµ1(z)zE
)−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
+
∫
z∈Zc
pz(zM , zE)dz (17)
Although implicitly, φ0 and φ1 in the other cases in the
following analysis can be defined similarly. These two equa-
3
tions can be viewed as additional constraints that the power
control policies need to satisfy, i.e., the right hand side (RHS)
of the two equations are also functions of (φ0, φ1), denoted
as φ(φ0, φ1), since the power control policies µ depend on
(φ0, φ1). Now that φ0 and φ1 take values from [0, 1] and
the RHS function takes values from [0, 1], we can find the
solution through an iterative algorithm according to the fixed-
point theorem3.
It is clear that (µ0, µ1) are the solutions to the following
λ0
φ0 loge 2
(1 + µ0zM )
−β−1zM − κ = 0 (18)
λ0
φ0 loge 2
(
1 +
µ0zM
1 + µ1zM
)−β−1
zM
1 + µ1zM
− κ = 0 (19)
−
λ0
φ0 loge 2
(
1 +
µ0zM
1 + µ1zM
)−β−1
µ0z
2
M
(1 + µ1zM )2
+
λ1
φ1 loge 2
(
1 + µ1zM
1 + γµ1zE
)−β−1
zM − γzE
(1 + γµ1zE)2
− κ = 0
(20)
where (18)-(20) are obtained by taking the derivative of J with
respect to µ0 for z ∈ Zc, µ0 for z ∈ Z , and µ1 for z ∈ Z ,
respectively. Whenever µ0 and µ1 turn out to have negative
values through these equations, they are set to 0 according to
the convexity of the optimization problem. Although the closed
form expressions for (µ0, µ1) are hard to find, we can get
some insight by examining (18)-(20). Define α1 = κφ0 loge 2λ0
and α2 = κφ1 loge 2λ1 , which are chosen to satisfy the average
power constraint (2) with equality. Not surprisingly, µ0 in Zc
behaves similarly as in point-to-point transmission [6]. Now,
consider (20). In order for µ1 to have a nonnegative value, the
following should be satisfied
zM − γzE
α2
− 1 ≥ 0. (21)
If µ0 = 0, we have from (20) that
1
α2
(
1 + µ1zM
1 + γµ1zE
)−β−1
zM − γzE
(1 + γµ1zE)2
− 1 = 0. (22)
After a simple computation using(19), we get
µ0zM
1 + µ1zM
=
(
zM
α1(1 + µ1zM )
) 1
β+1
− 1 (23)
which gives us that µ0 < 0 if
zM
α1(1 + µ1zM )
< 1. (24)
This tells us that when the power allocated to confidential
message is large enough, there should be no common message
transmission. Furthermore, substituting (19) and (22) into (20),
we have
1
α2
(
1 + µ1zM
1 + γµ1zE
)−β−1
zM − γzE
(1 + µ1zE)2
−
(
zM
α1(1 + µ1zM )
) 1
β+1
= 0
(25)
This is for the case when both µ0 and µ1 turn out to
3Although trivially, either φ0 or φ1 taking value 0 or 1 will at the same
time turn out to be some value in (0,1) for the function φ(φ0, φ1), which
tells us that the solution of φ0 or φ1 is in (0,1).
have positive values directly from the optimization condition
equations.
The following algorithm can be used to determine the
optimal power allocation:
ALGORITHM PCI (Power Control I)
1 Given λ0, λ1, obtain κ∗, φ∗0, φ∗1;
2 Denote α1 = κ
∗φ∗0 loge 2
λ0
, α2 =
κ∗φ∗1 loge 2
λ1
;
3 if zM − γzE > α2
4 then Compute µ1 from (22);
5 if µ1 > 1α1 −
1
zM
or zM < α1
6 then µ0 = 0;
7 else if zM−γzE
α2
>
(
zM
α1
) 1
β+1
8 then Compute µ1 from (25);
9 Substitute µ1 to (19) to get µ0;
10 else µ1 = 0, µ0 =
[
1
α
1
β+1
1
z
β
β+1
M
− 1
zM
]+
;
11 else µ1 = 0, µ0 =
[
1
α
1
β+1
1
z
β
β+1
M
− 1
zM
]+
;
The optimal values κ∗, φ∗0, φ∗1 can be numerically computed
to satisfy the average power constraint.
With the above analysis of the optimal power allocation pol-
icy of (µ0, µ1), the condition (14) essentially requires that the
power allocated to µ1 is large such that the interference from
sending confidential messages is stronger in the expression for
R01(µ), i.e., higher effective secrecy throughput.
Case II: The maximal instantaneous common message rate
is given by the rate of receiver 2
R02 =
{
log2
(
1 + γµ0(z)zE1+γµ1(z)zE
)
, z ∈ Z
log2 (1 + γµ0(z)zE) , z ∈ Z
c
(26)
as long as the obtained power control policy satisfies
R01(µ) > R02(µ). (27)
Then, the Lagrangian is given by
J = −
λ0
β loge 2
loge
(∫
z∈Z
(
1 +
γµ0(z)zE
1 + γµ1(z)zE
)−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
+
∫
z∈Zc
(1 + γµ0(z)zE)
−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
)
−
λ1
β loge 2
loge
(∫
z∈Z
(
1 + µ1(z)zM
1 + γµ1(z)zM
)−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
+
∫
z∈Zc
pz(zM , zE)dz
)
− κ (Ez∈Z{µ0(z) + µ1(z)}+ Ez∈Zc{µ0(z)}) (28)
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(µ0, µ1) are the solutions to the following
λ0
φ0 loge 2
(1 + γµ0zE)
−β−1
γzE − κ = 0 (29)
λ0
φ0 loge 2
(
1 +
γµ0zE
1 + γµ1zE
)−β−1
γzE
1 + γµ1zE
− κ = 0 (30)
−
λ0
φ0 loge 2
(
1 +
γµ0zE
1 + γµ1zE
)−β−1
µ0(γzE)
2
(1 + γµ1zE)2
+
λ1
φ1 loge 2
(
1 + µ1zM
1 + γµ1zE
)−β−1
zM − γzE
(1 + γµ1zE)2
− κ = 0
(31)
where (29)-(31) are obtained by taking the derivative of J
with respect to µ0 for z ∈ Zc, µ0 for z ∈ Z , and µ1 for
z ∈ Z , respectively. Whenever µ0 or µ1 turns out to have
negative values through these equations, they are again set to
0.
Following a similar analysis as shown for Case I, we obtain
the following algorithm to determine the optimal power control
policies.
ALGORITHM PC-II (Power Control II)
1 Given λ0, λ1, obtain κ∗, φ∗0, φ∗1;
2 Denote α1 = κ
∗φ∗0 loge 2
λ0
, α2 =
κ∗φ∗1 loge 2
λ1
;
3 if zM − γzE > α2
4 then Compute µ1 from (22);
5 if µ1 > 1α1 −
1
γzE
or γzE < α1
6 then µ0 = 0;
7 else if zM−γzE
α2
>
(
γzE
α1
) 1
β+1
8 then Compute µ0 and µ1 from (30) and (31);
9 else µ1 = 0, µ0 =
[
1
α
1
β+1
1
(γzE)
β
β+1
− 1
γzE
]+
;
10 else µ1 = 0, µ0 =
[
1
α
1
β+1
1
(γzE)
β
β+1
− 1
γzE
]+
;
where κ∗, φ∗0, φ∗1 can be numerically computed to satisfy the
average power constraint.
According the above optimal power allocation policy of
(µ0, µ1), in contrast to Case I, the condition (27) indicates that
the power allocated to µ1 is small such that the interference
from sending confidential messages can be ignored in R01(µ),
i.e., smaller effective secrecy throughput.
Case III: The first two sub-cases A) and B) are trivial
because, other than the condition R01(µ) = R02(µ), there is
no difference in the power allocation policies from what we
have derived in Case I and Case II. We are more interested in
the case in which there is 0 < δ∗ < 1 decided by the following
condition
R01(µ
δ∗) = R02(µ
δ∗)and C01(µδ
∗
) = C02(µ
δ∗). (32)
We will first derive the optimal power control policies for any
given δ∗, and then determine δ∗.
The Lagrangian is given by
J = −
λ0
β loge 2
[
δ loge
(∫
z∈Z
(
1 +
µ0(z)zM
1 + µ1(z)zM
)−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
+
∫
z∈Zc
(1 + µ0(z)zM )
−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
)
+ (1− δ) loge
(∫
z∈Z
(
1 +
γµ0(z)zE
1 + γµ1(z)zE
)−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
+
∫
z∈Zc
(1 + γµ0(z)zE)
−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
)]
−
λ1
β loge 2
loge
(∫
z∈Z
(
1 + µ1(z)zM
1 + γµ1(z)zM
)−β
pz(zM , zE)dz
+
∫
z∈Zc
pz(zM , zE)dz
)
− κ (Ez∈Z{µ0(z) + µ1(z)}+ Ez∈Zc{µ0(z)}) (33)
(µ0, µ1) are the solutions to the following
λ0
φ0 loge 2
(
δ(1 + µ0zM )
−β−1
zM + (1− δ)(1 + γµ0zE)
−β−1
γzE
)
− κ = 0
(34)
λ0
φ0 loge 2
(
δ
(
1 +
µ0zM
1 + µ1zM
)−β−1
zM
1 + µ1zM
+ (1− δ)
(
1 +
γµ0zE
1 + γµ1zE
)−β−1
γzE
1 + γµ1zE
)
− κ = 0 (35)
−
λ0
φ0 loge 2
(
δ
(
1 +
µ0zM
1 + µ1zM
)−β−1
µ0z
2
M
(1 + µ1zM )2
+ (1− δ)
(
1 +
γµ0zE
1 + γµ1zE
)−β−1
µ0(γzE)
2
(1 + γµ1zE)2
)
+
λ1
φ1 loge 2
(
1 + µ1zM
1 + γµ1zE
)−β−1
zM − γzE
(1 + γµ1zE)2
− κ = 0
(36)
where (29)-(31) are obtained by taking the derivative of J
with respect to µ0 for z ∈ Zc, µ0 for z ∈ Z , and µ1 for
z ∈ Z , respectively. Similarly as before, whenever µ0 or µ1
have negative values through these equations, they are set to
0. Considering (35), we see that when µ0 = 0, µ1 needs to
satisfy
λ0
φ0 loge 2
(
δzM
1 + µ1zM
+
(1− δ)γzE
1 + γµ1zE
)
− κ ≤ 0 (37)
and µ1 is given by (36)
λ1
φ1 loge 2
(
1 + µ1zM
1 + γµ1zE
)−β−1
zM − γzE
(1 + γµ1zE)2
− κ = 0 (38)
When µ1 = 0, µ0 is given by
λ0
φ0 loge 2
(
δ (1 + µ0zM )
−β−1
zM+
(1− δ)

1 + γµ0zE
)−β−1
γzE

− κ = 0 (39)
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Now, for µ1 ≥ 0, we need to have the following
−
λ0
φ0 loge 2
(
δ (1 + µ0zM )
−β−1
µ0z
2
M+
(1− δ) (1 + γµ0zE)
−β−1
µ0(γzE)
2
)
+
λ1(zM − γzE)
φ1 loge 2
− κ ≥ 0
(40)
where µ0 is computed from (39).
For any δ, we need to find the associated power control
policy (µ0, µ1) satisfying (34)-(36). Then, we need to further
search over 0 < δ < 1 for δ∗ that satisfies
C01(µ) = C02(µ). (41)
We obtain the following algorithm to determine the optimal
power control policies.
ALGORITHM PC-III-C (Power Control III − C)
1 Given λ0, λ1, obtain κ∗, φ∗0, φ∗1;
2 Denote α1 = κ
∗φ∗0 loge 2
λ0
, α2 =
κ∗φ∗1 loge 2
λ1
;
3 if zM − γzE > α2
4 then Compute µ1 from (38);
5 if (37) holds or δzM + (1− δ)γzE < α1;
6 then µ0 = 0;
7 else if (40) holds
8 then Compute µ0 and µ1 from (35) and (36);
9 else µ1 = 0, µ0 is given by (39);
10 else µ1 = 0, µ0 is given by (39);
where κ∗, φ∗0, φ∗1 can be numerically computed to satisfy the
average power constraint.
Based on the previous results, we have the following algo-
rithm to find the optimal power control policies.
ALGORITHM PC (Power Control)
1 Find µ(1) given in Case I;
2 if R01(µ(1)) < R02(µ(1))
3 then µ∗ = µ(1);
4 else if R01(µ(1)) = R02(µ(1)) and C01(µ) > C02(µ)
5 then µ∗ = µ(1);
6 else Find µ(2) given in Case II;
7 if R01(µ(2)) > R02(µ(2))
8 then µ∗ = µ(2);
9 else if R01(µ(2)) = R02(µ(2)) and C01(µ) < C02(µ)
10 then µ∗ = µ(2);
11 else For a given δ, find µ(3) given in Case III-C;
12 Search over 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 to find δ that satisfies
13 R01(µ(3)) = R02(µ(3)) and C01(µ(3)) = C02(µ(3))
14 µ∗ = µ(3).
In Fig. 2, we plot the achievable effective secrecy through-
put region in Rayleigh fading channel. We assume that γ = 1,
i.e., the noise variances at both receivers are equal. In the
figure, the circles fall into Case I or Case III-A, and the pluses
fall into Case II or Case III-B, and Case III-C is shown as line
only.
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Fig. 2. The achievable secrecy throughput region. T = 2 ms, B = 105 Hz,
and SNR = 0 dB.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the fading broadcast
channels with confidential message under statistical QoS con-
straints. We have first defined the effective secrecy throughput
region, which was later proved to be convex. Then, the prob-
lem of finding points on the boundary of the throughput region
is shown to be equivalent to solving a series of optimization
problem. We have extended the approach used in previous
studies to the scenario considered in this paper. Following
similar steps, we have determined the conditions satisfied by
the optimal power control policies. In particular, we have
identified the algorithms for computing the power allocated to
each fading state from the optimality conditions. Numerical
results are provided as well.
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